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CROSS-SECTORAL COORDINATION OF DISASTER RELIEF
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Abstract
Coordinating organizational activity across different sectors is crucial in disaster management. We
analyzed the response of 291 aid workers to the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and found that common
incentives and a high degree of equality among aid organizations positively affected perceived network
coordination. Large and public organizations were more likely to take leadership roles and high numbers
of public organizations involved in the disaster response network led to improved network coordination.
These results indicate the need for mechanisms that enable smaller and nonprofit organizations to
participate in network coordination and leadership.
Keywords: Network coordination, disaster management, cross-sectoral networks, complex humanitarian
emergencies.

INTRODUCTION: COORDINATING DISASTER RESPONSE
International responses to disasters, whether natural or manmade, require coordination between
organizational actors that differ by sector, experience, nationality, and specialty (Kettl 2003; Mitchell
2006). Disaster response in developing countries requires particularly good coordination, as acute
emergencies such as earthquakes, tsunamis, or epidemics occur on top of underlying chronic problems.
The underlying chronic issues of corruption, lack of transparency, institutional incompetence, weak
democratic traditions, etc. complicate recovery efforts in a variety of ways. Relief organizations in these
settings must work together to address both the acute and chronic problems simultaneously.
Disaster networks usually include four critical actors: 1) public international organizations, e. g. UN
(United Nations), EU (European Union), State Departments and ministries of defense, USAID (United
States Agency for International Development), GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit) ; 2) international nonprofit organizations (NPOs), e. g. ICRC (International Community
of the Red Cross), CARE, CRS (Catholic Relief Services), World Vision, MSF (Médecins sans
Frontières); 3) host country government (at various levels) and 4) host country NPOs and civil society.
The nature of the disaster determines the mix of these players and their relative importance or power. At
times the international community is left to negotiate its own social order, in others hierarchical or
centralized structures or mechanisms exist (Martin 2004). For example, nation building operations tend to
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involve more multilateral public organizations while pure humanitarian activities might involve more
international NPOs.
Calls for improved coordination of disaster networks are not new. Post-mortems on disasters and other
complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) of all types, from earthquakes and floods to terrorist attacks
and war, consistently identify the lack of coordinated responses as a prime culprit limiting overall
effectiveness (Kettl 2003; Kapucu 2006; Comfort 2007). Coordination proves difficult as cross-sectoral
networks are formed hastily and expected to perform well without previous practice or contractual
agreements (Waugh and Streib 2006; Moynihan 2008). The literature on disaster and network
management neither analyses the factors that facilitate good network coordination, nor informs on the
effects of different organizational type and structure on coordination. To address this gap, we developed
four hypotheses using a framework introduced by Faerman et al. (2001). The first goal of our study was
to identify the factors that influence network coordination in disaster settings. A second goal was to
analyze differences in network coordination across different types and sizes of aid organizations. Our
findings are based on an analysis of a survey of 291 aid workers responding to the Haiti earthquake in
2010.
Our research also led us to conclude that there is no common understanding of what exactly constitutes
cooperation, coordination, or collaboration. Keast et al. (2007) described each as a type of interorganizational relationship with increasing levels of intensity of the linkages between organizations.
Collaboration requires more organizational embeddedness than coordination; coordination requires more
intensity than cooperation. Yet, some researchers and practitioners seem to use the terms interchangeable
to describe and evaluate inter-organizational relationships after disaster (Drabek and McEntire 2002;
Nylén 2007; Kilby 2008; Gazley 2010).
We suggest they are qualitatively different activities. To cooperate is to operate alongside other
stakeholders, exchanging and sharing as appropriate to the setting; literally to “co-operate”. Coordination
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requires more overt strategic thinking to align, organize, and differentiate participating organizations’
activities between beneficiaries, tasks, regions, or tactics. Collaboration refers to activities that cross
organizational boundaries, requiring both organizations involved to alter their own behaviors based on the
others’. In the case of the organized but hastily formed response of aid organizations in a disaster setting,
we refer to the term coordination, in particular, network coordination. We expect that a well coordinated
network of aid organizations can improve the overall performance of organizations within the disaster
response by helping organizations operate more efficiently, avoid overlap and duplication of service, and
maximize specialization where possible. As such, this study stresses the factors affecting interorganizational coordination during disasters.

DIMENSIONS INFLUENCING NETWORK COORDINATION
Jones et al. (1997) develop a ‘theory of network governance’ suggesting networks can be considered a
better form of governance than market or hierarchy under conditions of uncertainty, complexity,
information constraints, and asset specificity. Disasters by definition encompass turbulent and complex
situations that require flexible decision making under uncertain conditions and information constraints.
Thus, networks of aid organizations should be the appropriate form of coordination and governance to
respond to disasters. However, such complex settings present additional network difficulties for
organizations engaged in the management of a disaster.
Van Wart and Kapucu (2011) highlight the difference between crisis management and emergency
management. Crisis management refers to the management of unforeseen events, while emergency
management refers to the planned management of and for emergencies. The two subfields both contribute
to our work, as international development agencies exist for and plan for emergencies routinely, yet the
size, scope, and location of the actual disaster response typically requires crisis management skills. Thus
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leaders and the disaster literature must embrace both - with the hopes that more emergency management
planning will mitigate crisis management inadequacies.
From the interorganizational literature we derive four factors that affect network exchanges during crisis
management: Predisposition to work with others, common incentives, leadership, and equality of
involved players (Faerman et al. 2001). We expect that all of these factors have an impact on network
coordination. We further expect the network coordination differs according to the size and sector an
organization is active in, as well as the size of the network it operates in. Our research framework is
shown in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here]
Predisposition refers to the initial tendencies and feelings towards potential partners that favor or inhibit
working together (Faerman et al. 2001). Players who may not have worked together previously, and many
who have, must often come together under extreme pressure to solve incredibly complex problems,
stretching institutional capacities to a limit (Noordegraaf and Newman 2011). However, not all disasters
occur in places where such networks previously existed. The capacity of government, communities, and
civil society in a host country and the predisposition or willingness for the international community to
cooperate with these actors proves critical.
We cannot expect players involved in disaster relief to arrive in theater with a tabula rasa. For example,
Partners in Health has a phenomenal reputation in Haiti. Government bureaucracies are notoriously slow.
NPOs can act independently. Large organizations can be less flexible than smaller ones, who may be
accused of minimal accountability. Therefore, we express the importance of predisposition in our first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A high degree of positive predisposition among organizations engaged in network
activities positively affects the perceived network coordination.
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Incentives refer to the benefits received from partnering and the ongoing structuring of relationships
(Faerman et al. 2001). Organizations may have incentives to work together as knowledge can be pooled
and information shared to handle the disaster more effectively. Networks of action during disasters are
generally understood as large scale systems that find synergies, economies of scale and scope, best
practices, and lessons learned to avoid duplicates, inefficiencies, and waste while leveraging skills,
experiences, and resources for optimal output (Smith et al. 1995; Najam 2000; Comfort et al. 2004; Shu
and Furuta 2007; Thomson et al. 2008; Ödlund 2010). Networks provide exchange mechanisms –
whether goods or service, best practices, personnel, or information, etc. These incentives help determine
stakeholder involvement, especially when time, budgets, and personnel are severely limited. Our second
hypothesis focuses on these incentives:
Hypothesis 2: Common incentives among organizations engaged in network activities positively
affect the perceived network coordination.
Leadership serves as a constant complaint in chaotic development settings (Nolte and Boenigk 2011).
Ideally, local government has the capacity to act as a lead organization and coordinate the disaster
response. But often times they cannot, due to traditional shortcomings or incapacitation due to the actual
disaster. Responders typically lament that no one is in charge, but question any organization that attempts
to take charge. Regardless, some leadership efforts must take place. In Haiti, the UN very much served as
a lead agency, despite the fact that the UN itself was decimated by the earthquake. We formulate our third
research hypothesis to test the effect of leadership on network coordination:
Hypothesis 3: The presence of leadership organizations engaged in network activities positively
affects the perceived network coordination.
Finally the level of equality among the numerous and varied players involved in disaster response
represents an important measure of likely network success (Faerman et al. 2001). Equality refers to the
embeddedness, similarity, and reciprocity enjoyed between organizations and how that might affect
6

perceptions of coordination overall in the network. A great variety of organizations involved in the same
operations could worsen the disaster response (Comfort et al. 2001), as each organization will pursue its
own goals and equality will be more difficult to achieve, e. g. in the area of decision making.
Organizations might be reluctant to cooperate if there is competition between them for donations, or each
organization wants to be the “first” responder to gather the attention of the media (Martin and Miller
2003; Stephenson 2005). At times, nonprofit managers are reluctant to work with local government
agencies since they feel that time and energy is lost in political discussions associated with aid
distribution (Moore et al. 2003). Additionally, cultural differences between the host country/host country
organizations and international organizations can affect the performance of the network (Ödlund 2010).
Thus, a fourth hypothesis is derived:
Hypothesis 4: A high degree of equality among organizations engaged in network activities
positively affects the perceived network coordination.
Analyzing these four key factors can help practitioners better understand what is meant by improved
coordination. In other words, if these four factors contribute to improved inter-organizational exchanges,
might they themselves be the target of improvements providing more direction than vague and generic
calls to simply ‘coordinate more.

RESEARCH SETTING
Haiti shares the island Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic, located between the North American and
Caribbean Plates, and thus is prone to earthquakes. It is the poorest country in the Americas and has very
little earthquake-ready infrastructure. Haiti has a long history of chronic social, political, legal, and
economic problems. Haiti struggled through several extraordinary disasters in 2010: A devastating
earthquake, Hurricane Tomas, a Cholera epidemic, and election irregularities and violence. These acute
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problems occurred on top of long recognized chronic problems like political instability, weak governance,
corruption, and a remarkably poor physical and institutional infrastructure, making recovery efforts
exceedingly difficult.
Acute disasters
In 2008 Hurricanes Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike left a combined 800 dead and widespread destruction.
On several occasions during interviews in Haiti preparing this research, aid workers actually referred to
programs still addressing that previous crisis, two years later (longer term projects taking place in some of
the harder hit parts of the country). So in many ways several acute crises did indeed intertwine to create
an even more complex situation on the ground.
However, the 7.0 earthquake of January 12, 2010 was unprecedented, leaving 230,000-316,000 dead,
(reports vary widely on this figure) and approximately 1.5 million internally displaced people. The
destruction was widespread. The densely populated and poorly constructed capital, Port-au-Prince, was
severely damaged. A year later approximately 800,000 internally displaced people still live in tents
throughout the country.
Hurricane Tomas hit the battered country in November 2010, and while the country was spared a full on
disaster (4 dead, massive flooding), it was reminded of its vulnerabilities. Huge numbers of Haitians
living even more densely in tent cities with inadequate sanitation, lacking clean water, hungry, and
unemployed created additional problems. Roughly at the same time, the initial stages of the Cholera
epidemic were made known, causing great concern that what was initially isolated in rural villages could
makes its way to the dense tent cities and cause massive causalities. As of June, 2011, Cholera claimed
nearly 5,500 lives from nearly 300,000 cases, straining the country’s already inadequate and badly
damaged health care system.
Chronic problems of governance and leadership
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Haiti’s history demonstrates some of the chronic underlying problems of governance and leadership. The
Duvalier regimes from 1957-1971 and 1971-1986 are together accused of being responsible for some
40,000 political deaths. After Jean-Claude Duvalier was forced into exile in 1986, various military
dictatorships ran the country until Aristide’s first and brief presidency in 1991. Upon Aristide’s exile, a
military junta, provisional president and acting presidents held office until his ‘reinstatement’ in 93-94
where he was recognized, though still in exile. Aristide led the country until 1996, when René Préval took
over until 2001. Aristide began his second short-lived presidency from 2001 until his exile in 2004. After
a provisional presidency René Préval again held office from 2006-2011. In all, Haiti has seen some 19
changes in head of state in the 25 years since the Duvalier regime.
Regarding the most recent 2011 elections, irregularities in the November 2010 first round vote caused
violent riots after the government’s hand-picked successor secured a place in the run-off. Fraud and
voting rights violations were widely reported. After much international community influence, the results
were revised. In April, 2011, Michel Martelly defeated Mirlande Manigat in the run-off election. In
addition, bizarrely, the country’s exiled dictator, Duvalier, returned to the country amid chaos, rumor,
accusations, and massive media attention. Former president Aristide also returned on the eve of the
election, potentially contributing to the very low voter turnout after public statements to that effect to his
supporters. It has been a relentless period of grief and difficulty for Haiti.
The new administration faces massive hurdles. Haiti requires substantial humanitarian assistance,
including shelter, healthcare, food, water, and sanitation. Decentralization and related governmental
reforms related to corruption and transparency, in addition to massive improvements in ministerial
competence, are required to push the country ahead. Economic stagnation undermines any reform efforts.
The country, with a population of about 9.5 million, sustained massive unemployment, 2 percent growth
and 5 percent inflation prior to the earthquake making it the poorest country in the western hemisphere.
Its 2010 GDP of 1200 USD actually represents a decline over the last three decades. Estimated growth
rate for 2010 is -8 percent and upwards of two third of the population are currently unemployed.
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The new government must also take control of its own future. A crucial step it to implement its reform
program, as begun several years ago, the Programme-Cadre de Reforme de l’Etat: Modernisation
Administative et Decentralisation, 2007-2012 to improve civil service. Property dispute resolution
mechanisms and accurate registries are essential, as is reforming the police and judicial system. The
Haitian National Policy and MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) must insure peaceful
elections and a stable environment during the new government. Economic policies to encourage
investment and business must be encouraged and obstacles removed. Housing and infrastructure
reconstruction efforts will require major investments and face substantial obstacles. The rubble removal
alone requires extraordinary manpower, time, and resources – not to mention road, telecommunications,
water, and sewage systems. Schools and educational systems, as well as health care systems must return
to normalcy after this disastrous year. All of these reforms address the underlying chronic problems that
prevented more effective and efficient responses to the acute disasters of this past year (RAND
Corporation 2010).
Coordination bodies
Two main official mechanisms exist to help coordinate activities. The UN and specifically the OCHA
(Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) is tasked to take leadership roles and coordinate
tasks in disaster-affected countries (Kent 2004). The UN cluster system became the model of choice to
centralize and coordinate activities in such settings. This is the primary vehicle through which members
of the international community keep up with activities of other members. The clusters separated
responders into 12 response arenas each with a lead agency responsible for initial coordination efforts.
The clusters (and lead agency) are: Camp Coordination and Management (International Organization for
Migration, IOM); Education (United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF); Emergency Shelter and NonFood Items (IOM); Food (World Food Programme, WFP); Logistics (WFP); Protection (Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR); Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (UNICEF);
Agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO); Early Recovery (United Nations Development
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Programme, UNDP); Emergency Telecommunications (WFP), and Health (World Health Organization,
WHO).
In addition, the establishment of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission served as a centralizing
mechanism. It provided an initial place where databases of projects were maintained, cataloged, and made
searchable by donors, partners, implementers, and local agencies. It asked all responders to submit all
projects through this mechanism for tracking purposes, but not all obliged in the chaos of response. One
Response, a web portal, also served a similar function, centralizing electronic information, Google
Groups, meeting minutes, reports, maps, and other activities for all the clusters, many of which also had
their own, more specialized systems.
Alongside these official coordination mechanisms, several organizations formed their own networks, e. g.
pre-defined networks of NPOs like Alliance Development Works (alliance of five German NPOs) or
Alliance2015 (alliance of seven international NPOs), or networks that were established due to common
cultural backgrounds, such as the coordination of German public and NPOs by the German embassy.

METHOD
In autumn, 2010, we distributed a survey to aid workers active in Haiti who were engaged in the UN
cluster networks (n=291; 24% response) detailing their understanding of the four factors and their
influence on network coordination. We tested our four factor model empirically using structural equation
modeling. The results were further interpreted by mean comparison. We then followed up on the survey
by conducting several in-depth face-to-face interviews in Port-au-Prince in January 2011.
Data collection and sample characteristics
The survey data is a subset of a larger online survey of aid workers that were active in the disaster
response after the Haiti earthquake. This survey aimed at testing a process model to assess network
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performance during disasters. In October and November 2010, 1,214 individuals that attended UN cluster
meetings in Haiti were invited to participate in our online survey. By February 2011, 291 questionnaires
were completed; a 24 percent response rate. Forty-two cases were excluded because too many items were
left unanswered, leaving an effective sample size of 249. We applied the expectation-maximization (EM)
algorithm to address the remaining missing values (Dempster et al. 1977) in our structural equation
analysis.
Of the 249 questioned disaster respondents, 70.9 percent reported they worked for a nonprofit
organization, 22.3 percent for a public organization, and 2.4 percent said they worked for a private
organization during the Haiti earthquake response. A remaining 4.5 percent reported they worked for
another type of organization, mostly stating “international organization” and it remained unclear, whether
this organization was nonprofit, public, or private. With regard to organizational size, 44.9 percent of the
respondents stated they worked for a large organization with more than 249 employees. 19.4 percent
worked for a medium sized organization with 50 to 249 employees, 20.2 percent for a small organization
with 11 to 49 employees. The remaining 15.4 percent of aid workers were active for a very small
organization with 10 or less employees.
Measures used in the study
Dependent variable
Indicators to describe network coordination were derived from network and disaster management
literature (Gazley 2008; Thomson et al. 2008). Coordination in our case refers to the perception of
coordination on the part of those involved in the network. In general, by perceived coordination we refer
to task and network management, clear understanding of roles and responsibilities (Thomson et al. 2008),
effective meetings, and shared resources (Gazley 2008). The exchange or sharing of resources such as
volunteer or workspace is vital in a disaster setting, as tasks can be fulfilled faster when organizations can
receive scarce resources from other partners within the network. The indicators that explain network
12

coordination were measured on a seven-point Likert scale. For ease of interpretation, scale items were
inverted, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Our conceptualization of network
coordination is shown in Table 1.
[Table 1 here]
Independent variables
From our theoretical framework we derived four indicators that can explain network coordination. To
assess the developed model we included questions to explain these four factors derived from interviews
with disaster managers or previous literature, namely predisposition to cooperate (indicators derived from
interviews), incentives (Heide and John 1992), leadership (Provan and Kenis 2008), and equality (Shaw
2003; Brass et al. 2004). Indicators to describe these factors were also inverted and measured on a sevenpoint Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree, leadership was measured on a
three point scale, using a single indicator that differentiated between the degree of leadership, ranging
from 1 = organization acting in a network without central command to 3 = organization acting as a lead
organization. We consider a single item to assess leadership sufficient, as this construct consists of an
object that is easily and uniformly imagined (Rossiter 2002). Whereas the lead organization network
encompasses a highly centralized structure and goal consensus is of moderate importance, the shared
governance form of organizations acting in a network without central command requires higher levels of
goal consensus and trust among participating organizations (Provan and Kenis 2008). The four distinct
factors were identified through exploratory factor analysis. All factors have significant Cronbach’s alpha
values exceeding the threshold value of .7 (Nunnally 1978). The distinct factors, its conceptualization,
and factor loadings are shown in Table 2.
[Table 2 here]
Control variables
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To assess unobserved heterogeneity among the aid workers from different organizations, we controlled
for several attributes. First, we controlled for the size of the organizations, as large organizations might
have better resources that enable them to participate and gain more from the network than smaller
organizations. We distinguished between very small organizations (up to 10 employees), small
organizations (11-49 employees), medium organizations (50-249 employees), and large organizations
(more than 249 employees). Second, we included a dummy variable for type of organization to enable a
comparison of public organizations and other, nonprofit and private organizations. These categorical
variables were treated as continuous in the analysis, because a Bayesian estimation of the data yielded
values close to our used maximum likelihood method. Finally, we used the size of the public and
nonprofit network as a control variable, as organizations that operate in a larger network of organizations
might be more likely to find network partners to fulfill common tasks than organizations that work
together with only a small number of partners. For the following analysis, the actual number of
networking public and nonprofit organizations that were mentioned by each respondent was used.

ANALYSIS: FACTORS FACILITATING COORDINATION
Measurement model
To identify the impact of our four factors (predisposition, incentives, leadership, and equality) on network
coordination, confirmatory analysis was undertaken using AMOS 17.0. We used the maximum likelihood
method to test the developed model. All variables used in the model were tested for multivariate
normality. Most variables showed values of skewness and kurtosis between -2 and 2, therefore we
concluded that these variables were approximately normally distributed. Several fit indices such as
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), and Relative Fit Index
(RFI), alongside the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and Standardized Root Mean
Square Residual (SRMR) were used to assess the model fit. All fit indices except for RFI exceeded the
14

suggested value of .9, results for RMSEA and SRMR were below the threshold value of .08, thus the
model fit can be considered satisfactory (Hair et al. 2010). The detailed results of the analysis are listed in
Table 3. An analysis of the measurement model showed that all indicators used in the research model had
significant positive factor loadings on the according factors.
[Table 3 here]
Structural model
Table 4 lists the means and standard deviations of the dependent and independent variables used in our
research model. Overall, a high predisposition to cooperate can be identified. Common incentives were
also reported, but to a lesser degree. The surveyed aid workers acted in different network structures, most
of them reporting a leading role of its organization during the disaster relief. A certain degree of equality
was reported among organizations, but it reached much lower values than predisposition. In general, a
good degree of network coordination was reported by the aid workers in Haiti, but there was much room
for improvement.
[Table 4 here]
To assess the structural model, we first calculated the effect of control variables on network coordination.
Next, the four identified factors affecting network coordination were added and assessed by looking at
standardized path coefficients and t-values. The control variables accounted for about 5 percent of the
variance of network coordination.
[Table 5 here]
The analysis of the context variables increased the explained variance of network coordination to 69
percent, yielding positive path coefficients for all four variables. Common incentives and a high degree of
equality had a positive impact on the coordination of networks. According to our hypotheses, hypothesis
1 was not supported by the data. A high degree of predisposition to work together with organizations
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engaged in the disaster response did not affect the coordination of the network significantly. For
incentives, a highly significant path coefficient of .41 was identified (p<.001), which was consistent with
our hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3, however, was not supported. No significant effect of leadership could be
identified on network coordination. Our last hypothesis, hypothesis 4, was supported by our data: A high
degree of equality among organizations engaged in the disaster response positively affected network
coordination. A highly significant path coefficient (p<.001) of .39 was measured.
After the context was included, the results for the control variables slightly changed. Public organizations
perceived a slightly worse network coordination than all other types of organizations (NPOs and private
organizations). Regarding the control variable for organization size, a strong positive effect was
measured, indicating better network coordination for larger organizations. Additionally, the size of the
public network affected network coordination in that networks encompassing larger numbers of public
partners reported better coordination. The opposite was found for size of the nonprofit network, where
higher numbers of nonprofit partners involved led to a worsened perceived coordination of the network.
Mean comparison
To assess the impact of the control variables organization type, organization size, and size of the network
on the independent variables of our model, we compared means of the different control groups and
conducted t-tests. Significant differences between the groups regarding predisposition, incentives,
leadership, and/or equality could be identified between public and nonprofit organizations, between very
small organizations and all other sizes of organizations, as well as large organizations and all other sizes
of organizations. For the size of the public and the nonprofit network, significant differences were also
found. To estimate the effects for large and small public and nonprofit networks, we used the median to
separate two groups. Networks that consisted of up to four public organizations were considered small,
whereas the corresponding value was nine for nonprofit organizations. Networks with more than four
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public organizations and/or more than nine nonprofits were considered large networks. The results of the
mean comparison are presented in the Appendix.
The results show that public organizations had a significantly higher predisposition to cooperate (p <.05)
than nonprofit organizations. The difference between public and nonprofit organizations with regard to
leadership was also highly significant (p<.001) and public organizations also showed a higher degree of
equality than nonprofit organizations (p<.05).
The analysis of organization size revealed that larger organizations had a significant higher likelihood to
take leadership roles than very small organizations (p<.001). The means of very small and large
organizations indicated better predisposition and common incentives to cooperate than small and medium
organizations, but the t-tests showed no significant differences.
Organizations engaging in larger networks of public organizations had a significantly higher
predisposition than organizations acting in a small network (p<.05) and were more likely to take
leadership roles (p<.001). With regard to the size of the network of nonprofit organizations our results
demonstrate that larger networks of nonprofit organizations had more common incentives than
organizations engaged in small networks of nonprofit organizations (p<.05), were more likely to take
leadership roles (p<.001), and experienced a higher degree of equality (p<.05).

DISCUSSION
Context variables
From the literature, we derived our first hypothesis and stated that a high degree of predisposition among
organizations engaged in network activities would positively affect perceived network coordination. We
did not find support for this hypothesis in our analysis. Two possible reasons can explain this finding.
First, organizations in the complex environment of disasters might have no choice but to work together,
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no matter if there is a common level of sympathy or openness among the different actors. Thus, the
predisposition might not be important in this special setting of disasters. Second, the aid workers that
were surveyed were all part of the larger network of the UN; therefore we did not include the experience
of organizations that did not work in a network at all. All individuals surveyed had a certain level of
predisposition to cooperate; otherwise they would not have been attending the UN cluster meetings.
Evidence from five follow-up interviews with public and nonprofit managers involved in the Haiti
earthquake response that we conducted in Port-au-Prince in January 2011 suggested that predisposition to
cooperate could be seen from a few additional perspectives. First, in general, players were predisposed to
working with local counterparts, however often perceptions of significant obstacles prevented such
partnerships. In addition, that predisposition to work together, with locals or other internationals,
generally referred to cooperative activities, perhaps the lowest level of exchange. More coordinated or
collaborative activities proved much more complex and thus predisposition to engage in them diminished
simply because of the overwhelming effort required. Finally, there was some perception difference
depending on tenure in country and when players arrived. One responder suggested, “Well they have been
here since before the earthquake. They have a strong interest in rather long-term engagement. Sometimes
they feel they have a very critical eye on those organizations that came after the quake.” In some ways
this captures the difference between those responding to the acute disasters compared to those engaged in
long term chronic development issues.
Hypothesis 2 was that common incentives among organizations engaged in network activities would
positively affect the network coordination as perceived by relief workers. We did find statistical support
for this hypothesis. Incentives, such as the perception that information will be shared among partnering
organizations, had a strong effect on the degree of network coordination. During disasters, information
barriers exist due to infrastructural damages and organizations that were not acquainted with each other
before might work together on a joint task. Therefore, the presence of common incentives among the
members of networking organizations is important to coordinate future tasks and resources.
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In general, interviews supported our findings that stakeholders coordinated with players to achieve a
tangible and positive outcome. Participants referred to avoiding task overlaps, finding synergies, sharing
best practices and comparing notes on beneficiaries. They expressed limited tolerance for meetings for the
sake of meeting. These players were largely outcome oriented, for example, “the development ministry
and the foreign office have a history of bad relations because … they think we have no competence,
which in a way is true, most of us are not specialists.” Thus, perceiving little to gain, there was no
incentive to work together. On the other hand, another first responder suggested, “If they know each other
here and they know their work, they find each other and they link up, and we … also try, if I see someone
asking me [about a] program and I saw a NGO doing the same thing… I link them.”
Our third hypothesis suggested that the presence of leadership organizations engaged in network activities
would positively affect the perceived network coordination. This hypothesis could not be confirmed for
the whole group of surveyed aid workers. Several members of organizations that were fulfilling
leadership tasks reported very good network coordination, as well as several members of organizations
not engaged in leadership tasks. Thus, the degree of network coordination is not attributable to the
strategic or operative base per se; it depends on the specific skills of the organizations and its members in
the disaster context. Leadership and hierarchy seemed to go hand in hand to some extent since our work
did not explore group dynamics or project management levels. Higher level coordination didn’t resonate
with those on the ground. For example, “The EU coordination is mostly done between the ambassadors,
but it doesn’t go into detail, it is mostly political, the EU commission as I understand it is hopelessly
understaffed. [It] took me three months to get a project list from them.”
Our fourth hypothesis stated that a high degree of equality among organizations engaged in network
activities would positively affect the perceived network coordination. We found support for this
hypothesis. Aid workers of organizations who had equal power and who felt they could equally
participate in decision making did report a better coordination within the network. This closely relates to
common incentives, as organizations might be more engaged in network coordination if they felt they had
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an influence on decision making. For example, a responder suggested, “I don’t see a big danger of any
interference with anyone else. I know our bigger NGOs are very integrated in the system, they go to
cluster (meetings); they meet with other NGOs. They have a lot of funding from other agencies. They
have worked with EU and USAID, they have cooperation with them.”
Control variables
The analysis of our control variables yielded several significant effects of the four factors on network
coordination. With regard to organization type, public organizations showed higher values than NPOs in
predisposition, leadership, and equality. Public organizations are funded by the government; therefore
they are not dependent on donations. This limits the competition among them and other players within the
disaster network and thus can explain the higher predisposition of public organizations to work together
with others. Public organizations such as the UN or embassies are usually active on the strategic, rather
than the operative base and thus more likely to take leadership roles and act as coordination mechanisms.
Even though values for equality should be similar among different organizations as most organizations
acted in a network with the UN, public organizations felt there was higher equality among organizations
than NPOs did. As public organizations are usually engaged in leadership roles, they are the ones that
have a high influence on task coordination. Nonprofit organizations that have a smaller impact on
decision making and task coordination are more likely to feel unequal to the others. Regarding perceived
network coordination, public organizations expressed they experienced a worse coordination of the
disaster response network than other organizations. This is contradictory to the results of the mean
analysis, where public organizations reported higher values for all four independent variables. Public
organizations seem to evaluate their performance more critically, resulting in slightly worse perceived
network coordination.
The mean comparison of very small, small, medium, and large organizations revealed that large
organizations were more likely to take leadership roles than smaller ones. A possible explanation is that
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larger organizations are usually more experienced than small and medium organizations and have been
active in a disaster response before. Often a position even exists specifically tasked with overseeing
cooperative arrangements. The average years of engagement in disaster response activities for large
organizations were 39 years, as compared to very small organizations with 13 years. From the structural
equation analysis we found that the size of an organization also had a positive effect on network
coordination; perceived network coordination increased with larger organizations. Larger organizations
usually have more resources and financial assets than smaller organizations which makes it easier to
attend coordination meetings and be active in different areas of the disaster response. It is also likely that
larger organizations bring more resources to the network and therefore have a greater stake in network
management and leadership.
As an example, a representative of a large, well-known disaster response agency initiated the following
discussion, “I wanted to raise an issue my colleagues in the field are increasingly encountering. Although
we’ve had an agreed cluster strategy prioritizing sheeting over tents in Port-au-Prince for some time now,
the highly visible distribution of tents, particularly near the Logs base, have raised expectations amongst
beneficiaries that there will be universal coverage of dome or tunnel tents, and this is raising equality
issues.” This sort of policy level discussion seemed to emerge primarily from larger more established
organizations. Small NPOs struggling to make ends meet tended to be much more focused on logistics
and daily activities.
From the mean comparison of network size among the four factors we found that organizations acting in a
network with more than four public organizations had a higher predisposition to cooperate with others
and conducted more leadership tasks. We also found that incentives, leadership, and equality were higher
in organizations active in large nonprofit networks with more than nine NPOs included. The structural
equation analysis showed that the size of the public network positively affected perceived network
coordination, while a higher number of nonprofit organizations involved led to a worsened perception of
network coordination. Public organizations are usually engaged on the strategic base, thus more public
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organizations can facilitate and enable better task coordination, whereas nonprofit organizations are
usually conducting operative tasks and more nonprofit organizations involved might lead to a higher
complexity of the network and hinder coordination.

CONCLUSIONS
This article sought to assess the factors most relevant for effective network coordination during disaster
response. Based on the framework developed by Faerman et al. (2001), we analyzed the effect of
predisposition, incentives, leadership, and equality on network coordination as perceived by disaster
respondents. Our analysis showed that common incentives and high equality among network members
had a strong impact on network coordination. We also compared the network coordination and the four
factors among different types and sizes of organizations and sizes of the disaster network. Small
organizations were more likely to face challenges during coordination than larger organizations, and very
large and public organizations were more likely to take leadership roles within the network. Public
organizations evaluated their network coordination more critically than other organizations.
Our results indicate the need for mechanisms that enable smaller organizations and NPOs to participate in
network coordination and leadership. While NPOs perceived its network coordination slightly better than
public organizations, the mean comparison revealed that means for all four independent variables were
below those of public organizations and large numbers of NPOs involved in a disaster response network
worsened the network coordination. Better interaction across sectors could be fostered by encouraging
(smaller) nonprofit organizations to embrace strategic network coordination tasks despite the additional
burdens it requires. A well coordinated network response can help to provide efficient disaster relief, as
chaotic arenas within the networking organizations can be tamed and consensus achieved (Koppenjan
2008).
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Our study has a number of limitations that provide opportunities for further research. First, our
observations of aid workers are not independent. While all members that participated in cluster meetings
and provided contact information were contacted, organizations that had a larger share in coordination
activities, such as the UN mechanisms, had a larger share in the response to our survey, but by controlling
for organization type and size, overall implications can be given. Also, we only analyzed the network
around the UN clusters, therefore capturing organizations that already had a certain level of predisposition
to cooperate. For the future, different networks should be assessed; e. g. predefined alliances or hastily
formed networks that are limited to a certain disaster area.
Second, we are asking self reports, as this gives us some indication whether practitioners on the ground,
well aware of the criticisms launched against them generally, are aware of the extent to which they are
coordinated or not with those in their organizational field. In a future study, the opinion of the affected
population should be considered to gain an impression of their perception of network coordination.
However, while a limitation, this also presents a great opportunity for future research. We find that the
definition and perceptions associated with the words “cooperation,” “coordination,” and “collaboration”
may vary widely. Some respondents may be combining or misusing these terms. Others clearly articulate
very different meanings for each term, evidenced in their activities. Researchers would do well to clarify
these terms both theoretically, and professionally, anchored in grounded observation. Blanket calls to
improve cooperation or to blame limited success on the lack of international community coordination are
common in every major disaster. Future research should clarify the terms and differentiate between them
in terms of best practices and core components. Our four factors provide a start.
And finally, this research is limited to the case of Haiti during an exceedingly complex period in Haiti’s
development assistance history. Future research might target different regions within Haiti to understand
different localized economic and cultural settings more directly. Additionally, comparing responses to the
Haiti quake with earthquake responses in Chile, New Zealand, and Japan, which all occurred within
approximately one year of each other under very different circumstances, could highlight the additional
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complexities developing countries face in disaster recovery and response. Much of this story relates to the
existence of deep underlying chronic issues, such as governmental incompetence. Such assertions are not,
however, generally made about New Zealand and Japan, for example. In fact, a recent Brookings paper
compared the Japanese and Haitian disasters under the title, “What a difference government makes.”
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Predisposition
Hypothesis 1

Incentives
Hypothesis 2

Network Coordination
Hypothesis 3

Leadership
Hypothesis 4

Equality

Figure 1: Research framework and hypotheses
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Table 1: Conceptualization of network coordination
Network Coordination
Our organization's tasks were well coordinated with those of partner organizations.
We understood our organization's roles and responsibilities as a member of the network we formed with the
other organizations.
Our meetings with partner organizations accomplished what was necessary for the collaboration to function well.
Our sharing of resources with other organizations (e.g., volunteers, workspace, staff) was well coordinated.
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Table 2: Factor items and loadings
Factor 1
Predisposition (α=0.86)
We have positive feelings for the individuals involved in the
disaster response that we collaborated with.
Our organization was open toward collaborations with other
organizations active in the disaster response in Haiti.
We were open to join resources and engage in the disaster
response with other organizations.
We took special measures (e.g., joined meetings, used
personal networks) to facilitate collaborations with other
organizations.

Factor 3

Factor 4

Predisposition Incentives

Leadership

Equality

0.68

0.13

-0.08

0.20

0.88

0.18

-0.02

0.19

0.86

0.24

0.03

0.18

0.84

0.24

0.11

0.11

0.82

0.00

0.22

0.78

0.17

0.27

0.84

-0.01

0.18

0.00

0.08

0.98

0.10

0.14

0.17

0.07

0.83

0.18

0.23

0.18

0.84

0.27

0.26

-0.09

0.70

Incentives (α=0.85)
In our collaboration it was expected that any information that
0.20
might help the other organizations would be provided to them.
It was expected that the partners would provide proprietary
0.25
information if it could help the other partner.
It was expected that we kept each other informed about events
0.24
or changes that may have affected the other organizations.
Leadership (single item)
What role did your organization take within the network of
organizations active in the Haiti earthquake response?
Equality (α=0.83)
Our organization and the organizations we collaborated with
equally participated in decision making.
Our organization and the organizations we collaborated with
had the opportunity to influence our joint objectives and
processes.
Our organization and the organizations we collaborated with
had a strong mutual commitment to our joint goals and
objectives.

Factor 2
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Table 3: Fit indices of the research model
Model fit
suggested value
actual value

χ 2/df

CFI

NFI

IFI

RFI

RMSEA

SRMR

≤5

≥ .9

≥ .9

≥ .9

≥ .9

≤ .08

≤ .08

2.44

.95

.91

.95

.89

.076

.059
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Table 4: Means and standard deviations
Independent variables
Predisposition
Incentives
Leadership
Equality

scale
Organization showed predisposition to cooperate, 1=strongly
disagree; 7=strongly agree.

mean

SD

6.17

1.13

Organization had common understanding of issues and
5.53
incentives, 1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree.
Organization was acting in a network without central command
2.10
(1), engaged in lead organization tasks (3).
Organization experienced mutuality within network of aid
4.00
organizations, 1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree.

0.88

Network management was well coordinated, 1=strongly
disagree; 7=strongly agree.

1.47

1.38

1.53

Dependent variable
Network coordination

5.26
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Table 5: Structural model results
network coordination
step 1
standardized
path coefficient

step 2
t-value

standardized
path coefficient

t-value

control variab les
Organization type (0-other/1-public)

.12

1.72

-.06

1.21

Organization size

.17

2.47*

.18

3.78***

Size of public network

.09

1.34

.09

1.99*

-.01

0.19

-.11

2.34*

Predisposition

.11

1.53

Incentives

.41

4.57***

Leadership

.09

1.90

Equality

.39

5.28***

R²

.69

Size of nonprofit network
R²

.05

context variab les

* p < .05; significant at the .05 level (two-tailed); *** p < .001; significant at the .001 level (two-tailed).
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Appendix 1
Mean comparison for control variables
Control
variable

Expression of variable

Organization 1: public organization
type

Test variables
predisposition

0: nonprofit organization
1

issues & incentives

0
1

leadership

0
1

equality

n

M

SD

t

Sig.
(2-tailed)

48

6.42

0.71

2.08

0.04

1.82

0.07

9.92

0.00

2.62

0.01

0.65

0.52

0.39

0.69

-5.54

0.00

-2.48

0.12

0.41

0.68

0.12

0.91

5.53

0.00

1.86

0.07

2.29

0.02

1.72

0.09

4.43

0.00

1.89

0.06

1.82

0.07

2.03

0.04

4.19

0.00

2.19

0.03

148

6.10

0.98

45

5.79

1.11

141

5.41

1.25

53

2.79

0.49

144

1.82

0.85

55

5.61

0.98

170

5.13

1.25

Organization 1: very small organizations (≤10 employees) predisposition

33

6.27

1.11

size

175

6.15

0.94

31

5.59

1.51

0
0: all other organizations
1

issues & incentives

0
1

leadership

0
1

equality

0
1: large organizations (≥250 emp.)

predisposition

0: all other organizations
1

issues & incentives

0
1

leadership

1: public netw ork ≥5 organizations

size

0: public netw ork <5 organizations
1

0

204

5.38

1.09

93

6.20

0.85

115

6.14

1.05

90

5.52

1.21

107

5.50

1.26

5.42

1.07

132

5.14

1.32

predisposition

128

6.30

0.79

75

5.95

1.16

issues & incentives

118

5.63

1.12

75

5.33

1.29

leadership

117

2.32

0.85

86

1.79

0.83

equality

139

5.37

1.06

95

5.05

1.39

123

6.27

0.90

82

6.02

1.01

predisposition
issues & incentives

leadership

0
1

1.67

109

equality

0
1

0.86

4.67

0.87

0: nonprofit netw ork <10 organizations
1

2.21

37

0.77

0
1: nonprofit netw ork ≥10 organizations

178

1.82

0
1

0.68

2.44

0
1

1.18

1.45

95

0
Netw ork

5.50

31

114

0
1

166

equality

116

5.67

1.14

79

5.32

1.24

123

2.31

0.86

83

1.81

0.82

141

5.39

1.13

96

5.04

1.29
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